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ABSTRACT  As part of the larger trend towards “securitization” of citizenship, 
citizenship deprivation in Canada is becoming increasingly normalized, resulting in 
some cases in statelessness. In this article, I pursue a sociology of statelessness by 
examining its localized production and connections to a broader network of social 
and material relations. I do this through a case study of Canadian-born Deepan 
Budlakoti, who at age 22 was informed that he was in fact not Canadian, and lacking 
any other citizenship, was rendered stateless. Actor-Network Theory is employed to 
trace how it is that legal documental and heterogeneous networks of humans and 
things (e.g., a “legal technicality”) have been enrolled to produce a legal decision 
declaring that Budlakoti, despite his Canadian birth certificate and passports, was 
never a Canadian citizen. Yet because he has not exhausted all avenues to acquisition 
of some citizenship (e.g., in India or Canada), he also has failed to secure recognition 
of his statelessness. A particular innovation in this analysis is the exploration of the 
exemption in the Canadian Citizenship Act from jus soli citizenship for children born 
to foreign diplomatic staff. Networks of immigration tribunal and court judgements, 
and documents treated as evidence have connected and translated into establishing 
Budlakoti’s fit with this exemption, despite countervailing evidence and a lifetime of 
documented and state-assisted reproduction of his Canadianness. While robbed of his 
legal and social identity, and suffering the egregious consequences of statelessness, 
Budlakoti continues to campaign for restoration of his right to have rights within his 
country of birth. 
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Introduction 
Statelessness is an exceptional phenomenon in a world where having a 
nationality is not only a human right but also the statistical norm.1,2 It is a 
phenomenon more familiar in transitional regions of state dissolution, 
succession or breakup, involving structural discrimination against peoples 
and minority groups in Asia, Europe, Africa and the Middle East (Mandel & 
Gray, 2014). By way of contrast, statelessness appears to be a relatively 
foreign concept in the Canadian context. In comparative perspective, 
Canada’s citizenship laws have been regarded as among the most liberal and 
generous in the world, offering multiple avenues to full citizenship – jus soli 
and jus sanguinis at birth, and through naturalization for immigrants who as 
permanent residents already enjoy many citizenship-type rights. Yet, as I 
explore here in the case of a Canadian-born stateless man, Deepan 
Budladkoti, statelessness exists in Canada. As importantly, mechanisms and 
reforms in Canadian law and administrative practices serve to produce 
statelessness.  
Gradational citizenship, where the rights specifically to retain citizenship 
have been differentiated between Canadian- and foreign-born, as well as by 
race and ethnicity, is nothing new in the Canadian context. Indeed, as 
Anderson (2008, p. 88) points out, “the basic tension between the equality of 
all citizens and the authority of the state to revoke the citizenship of foreign-
born Canadians has existed since Confederation.” Citizenship revocation and 
deportation have variously targetted “dangerous European” labour radicals in 
the interwar years (Avery, 1979), Japanese Canadian citizens during World 
War II, and Nazi war criminals since the early 1990s (Anderson, 2008, p. 88). 
Nonetheless, the contemporary reputation of Canadian citizenship has been 
of “statefullness” (Kerber, 2007, p. 7) whereby full and permanent citizenship 
status has been either automatic at birth or relatively easy to gain and nearly 
impossible to lose.  
Yet, recent reforms in Canadian citizenship legislation and procedures 
during the near decade of Conservative rule (2006-2015), couched in 
language about “strengthening Canadian citizenship” and “protecting the 
security and safety of Canadians,” have again made citizenship a conditional 
privilege that is more difficult to acquire and easier to lose (Government of 
Canada, 2014b, 2014a, p. 1; National Immigration Law Section, Canadian 
Bar Association, 2014). Citizenship stripping reforms introduced in the 
Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (former Bill C-24), implemented in 
1 	There	 is	 no	 consensus	 on	 the	 difference	 between	 the two terms “nationality” and 
“citizenship;” the distinction between these terms also varies from country to country. They are 
frequently used synonymously to refer to full legal membership in a nation-state. The latter 
convention will be adopted in this paper.  
2 Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948) states: “1. 
Everyone has a right to a nationality. 2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor 
denied the right to change his nationality.” 
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the dying days of the Harper government, specifically targeted Canadian-born 
individuals convicted of certain offences against the state (Government of 
Canada, 2014a).3 Such reforms are significant insofar as they introduce new 
mechanisms for producing de facto statelessness among the Canadian-born. 
As explored in this article, there are other, less scrutinized mechanisms in 
Canadian citizenship law (such as the “diplomatic exception” to jus soli), and 
administrative practice that can strip the citizenship of Canadian-born 
individuals in a political climate where citizenship deprivation becomes 
increasingly normalized as part of the larger trend towards “securitization” of 
citizenship.  
In this article, I pursue a sociology of statelessness by examining its 
localized production and connections to a broader (and in some instances, 
transnational) network of social and material relations. I do this through a 
case study of Canadian-born Deepan Budlakoti, who at age 22 was informed 
that he was in fact not Canadian, and lacking any other citizenship, was 
rendered stateless. I utilize Actor-Network Theory (ANT) as an analytical 
guide for exploring how Budlakoti’s citizenship was extinguished. 
The article is organized to, first, discuss the scholarly contribution of a 
sociology of statelessness to current debates on this most abject of statuses. 
Here, I examine the potential relevance of ANT to provide conceptualization 
of deprivation of citizenship, and its particular bearing on Budlakoti’s 
translation from a Canadian birthright citizen to a stateless person. Second, 
the article briefly addresses some dimensions of contemporary statelessness 
in Canada, including its context of production through reforms in citizenship 
revocation, its prevalence and the consequences for those holding this abject 
legal status. Third, I explore the Budlakoti case to reveal the networked 
production of statelessness.  Here legal documental networks were central in 
creating the lived status of citizenship only to be replaced by another network 
of documents and other forces, which expunged that citizenship and produced 
statelessness.			
In the fourth part of the paper, I focus on how the government has utilized 
a listed exception in the Canadian Citizenship Act to jus soli citizenship, 
exempting the children born of foreign diplomats and their employees, to 
negate the two decades of Budlakoti’s government-assisted identity as a 
Canadian citizen. Finally, in the conclusion, I reiterate the social justice 
implications of the networked extinguishment of Budlakoti’s Canadian 
																																																								
3 Until recently, the Canadian-born have largely been secure in their citizenship status whereas 
there has been a long-standing tradition of revocation of citizenship for the foreign-born. Indeed, 
the grounds for revocation have undergone a process of expansion and contraction. Since 1868, 
grounds have expanded from misrepresentation or fraud during the process of naturalization, to 
“disloyalty to his Majesty” in 1919 to grounds of severe criminality in 1920 (Anderson, 2008, p. 
85). In order to limit the discretionary powers of the government and promote the equality of all 
citizens, the 1976 Immigration Act made false representation or fraud during application for 
citizenship the sole ground for revocation (Anderson, 2008, p. 85).  
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citizenship and briefly address the role of contestation, especially by 
Budlakoti himself, in resisting legal and social erasure. 
 
 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) and the Sociology of Statelessness 
 
Although scholarship on citizenship deprivation and statelessness in the 
Canadian context is fairly nascent, there has recently been a flurry of debate, 
engaged in primarily by legal scholars, political theorists and ethicists on the 
legal and normative (i.e., human rights) aspects of statelessness in Canada, 
the U.S., Australia and the European community (Edwards & van Waas, 
2014). An under-explored dimension of the literature is sociological analysis 
of the social relations, mechanisms, agency of multiple actors, documents, 
accidents (Nyers, 2009), bureaucratic errors, etc., that produce statelessness 
for certain subjects and populations, and of the lived experience and identities 
of stateless individuals and communities. Ethnographic and other qualitative 
methodologies have been illuminating of citizenship as not exclusively a 
juridical relationship between individuals and states involving particular 
statutory rights and obligations, but as importantly a negotiated and dynamic 
relationship within a network of institutions and social interactions spanning 
the state and civil society (Stasiulis, 2013; Stasiulis & Bakan, 2005). 
Similarly, Sigona (2016, p. 267) has argued that a sociological understanding 
of statelessness would place “the investigation of the everyday, concrete 
manifestations at its core, while being attentive also to the process of 
institutionalization of ‘statelessness’… [as] a technology of power operating 
across different scales and in different locales.” Sociological analysis would 
enrich our appreciation of the social relations of power that underlie the 
making and unmaking of citizenship and of the everyday experience of 
statelessness. It is essential for producing socio-legal comprehension of 
statelessness, illuminating how the social and legal realms interact and 
intertwine to produce this most abject of legal and social identities. 
Citizenship is usually regarded as far more than a mere legal bond between 
state and individual, albeit that legal status is fundamental to the enjoyment 
often of even basic human rights.4 It is also (in most cases) the lived 
experience of that legal bond or what the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
in the 1955 Nottebohm case referred to as the “genuine link” basis for 
citizenship defined in terms of “the social fact of attachment, a genuine 
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence 
of reciprocal rights and duties.”5 The genuine link (also called the “real and 																																																								
4 Even in the early U.S. and French declarations of rights, there was a recognition that “natural 
rights” or what are now commonly referred to as “universal human rights” granted to all 
individuals at birth, “could only be recognized and enforced in a practical way through 
membership in a State” (David Weissbrodt, quoted in Howard-Hassmann, 2015, p.1). 
5 Nottebohm (Liech. V. Guat.), 1955 ICJ 4, 23. Nottebohm was a man who was born in Germany, 
had German citizenship, but lived for 34 years in Guatemala, where he never became a citizen. 
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effective nationality”) criterion for citizenship is by no means the only or 
most desirable principle for deciding or extinguishing citizenship.6 De Groot, 
Vink and Honohan (n.d.), however, in their review of citizenship revocation 
patterns in Europe, argue that “[t]he fundamental principles governing 
provisions for loss of citizenship should be the absence of a genuine link and 
avoiding statelessness” (p. 6, emphasis added). A sociological study of 
statelessness, attentive to the quotidian denial of the relevance of the genuine 
link, and the stripping of a stateless person’s “reciprocal rights and duties” is 
critical for documenting the unremitting human rights violations and 
indignities suffered by those deprived of citizenship. 
Linda Kerber (2007, p. 31) argues that statelessness today “is most usefully 
understood not only as a status, but as a practice, made and remade in daily 
decisions of presidents and judges, border guards and prison guards, 
managers and pimps.” Yet, the process of legally and discursively producing 
statelessness involves not only decisions of various human agents, but also 
the agency of objects, particularly documents. As Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) insists, human action is entangled with its physical environment and 
material objects. Following Kerber and the insights of ANT, this paper seeks 
to understand Deepan Budlakoti’s extraordinary statelessness as a process of 
production involving heterogeneous networks of various prison and 
immigration officials, tribunals and courts, documents produced in different 
jurisdictions, and circumstances that have stripped him of his citizenship and 
left him vulnerable to indefinite immigration detention and removal from the 
only country he has ever known or where he has held meaningful ties. Only 
limited, albeit critical, segments of his ongoing networked production of 
statelessness will be examined here to explore how a “narrow question of 
fact” has served to extinguish a person’s lifelong formal and lived 
membership in Canada and create statelessness (Budlakoti v Canada 
(Citizenship & Immigration), 2015 FCA 139, para 10).7 ANT provides a 																																																																																																																							
On the eve of World War II, Nottebohm applied for and received citizenship from Liechtenstein, 
a country where he had few to no ties, in order to become a citizen of a neutral country rather 
than a belligerent one. Upon returning to Guatemala, he was refused entry on the grounds that he 
was an enemy alien, since Guatemalan authorities refused to recognize his change of nationality 
and regarded him as German. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) applied the “genuine link” 
test to decide against Nottebohm’s claim to citizenship in Lichtenstein.  
6 The genuine link theory stemming from Nottebohm does not purport to regulate nationality for 
all purposes. Sloane argues that the genuine link theory of citizenship, which has “developed into 
a kind of unreflective dogma” throughout the international law of nationality, is misguided and 
anachronistic. As people travel, work and live internationally, social attachment to nation states 
attenuates. Instead, he proposes that international law should regulate nationality in terms of its 
functions, “so as to better effectuate the diverse roles that nationality serves today” (Sloane, 
2009, p. 4). Nonetheless, he concedes that in some areas of law, such as in certain human rights 
cases, Nottebohm’s dicta may remain appropriate and effective, “serving to protect precisely the 
kind of deep social bonds emphasized in Nottebohm against a formal nationality imposed by 
law” (Sloane, 2009, p. 5, emphasis added).  
7 The “narrow question of fact” referred to by Justice Stratas in the Federal Court of Appeal 
decision of June 2015 is whether Mr. Budlakoti’s parents’ employment with the Indian High 
Commission ended before or after his birth. If before, then Deepan enjoyed jus soli citizenship; if 
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useful methodology to study the social action and networks of socio-legal 
objects - especially legal documents such as passports, birth certificates, 
tribunal and court decisions and supporting documentation, and fundamental 
pieces of legislation such as the Canadian Citizenship Act, as they become 
entangled with human decision-making. 
Actor-Network Theory (ANT) was developed in the 1980s by science and 
technology studies scholars Bruno Latour and Michel Callon and sociologist 
John Law (Callon & Latour, 1981). ANT has since been utilized in many 
different fields, including socio-legal studies (Cloatre, 2008; Cowan & Carr, 
2008; Grabaham, 2011; Levi & Valverde, 2008). As John Law points out, the 
actor-network approach is more of research method than a theory, grounded 
in empirical case studies, “a sensibility to the messy practices of relationality 
and materiality of the world” (2009, p. 142). A distinctive and innovative 
contribution of ANT is its “posthumanism” that subverts dualisms such as 
“human and non-human, meaning and materiality, big and small, macro and 
micro, social and technical, nature and culture…” (Law, 2009, p. 147). 
Human actors and non-human objects, all positioned in a “network of 
heterogeneous materials,” are treated equally as “actants,” determinants of 
social interactions and outcomes (Law, 1992, p. 381). 
The effort to identify significant processes producing the deprivation of 
Budlakoti’s Canadian citizenship (thus minimally creating de facto 
statelessness) is guided by ANT and its illuminating applications in socio-
legal studies .8 For one of ANT’s founders, Bruno Latour, law is a “network 
of people and things in which legality is not a field [with any sort of internal 
autonomy] to be studied independently” (Levi & Valverde, 2008, pp. 806, 
818). Rather, law is “an attribute that is attached to events, people, documents 
and other objects when they become part of the decision-making process…” 
(Levi & Valverde, 2008, p. 818). Latour’s approach to law both records the 
“often stammering human interaction that produces law” that is obscured by 
the public and impersonal voice of law (Levi & Valverde, 2008, p. 814), and 
brings notice to the “materiality of legal cases,” whereby case files are 
compiled and put together with rubber bands, staples and paper clips, a fact 
that can affect court decisions (e.g., because pages might be missing, 
outdated “facts” are reiterated, etc.) (Levi & Valverde, 2008, p. 816). The 
network of relations among various documents (birth certificates, 
employment contracts, witness affidavits, etc.) that may be transformed into 
evidence for a case constitutes legality. Once a “file is sufficiently ripened – 																																																																																																																							
after, then he was excluded from birthright citizenship through “diplomatic exception” under 
paragraph 3(2)(a) or 3(2)(b) of the Citizenship Act, 1985 (Budlakoti v. Canada (Citizenship and 
Immigration), 2015 FCA 139 para 10). 
8 The practical difference in access to rights between de jure and de facto statelessness is often 
minimal. A de jure stateless person is one “who is not considered as a national by any State by 
the operation of its laws” (1954 U.N. Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons). A 
de facto stateless person is one who “without having been deprived of their nationality no longer 
enjoy[s] the protection and assistance of their national authorities” (quoted in Brouwer, 2012, p. 
20). 
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with an increasing number of documents added to it” from different offices 
and bureaucracies, “the alchemy of legal decision making takes place” (Levi 
& Valverde, 2008, p. 817).  
Networks under ANT are regarded as “flows of translations,” referring to 
“all the negotiations, intrigues, calculations, acts of persuasion and violence” 
by which an authority speaks or acts on behalf of another actor or force 
(Cowan & Carr, 2008, p. 152). They are mobile but also “hold patterns of 
links stable, at least for a period of time” (Cowan & Carr, 2008, p. 152). 
Participants in networks are active mediators as opposed to passive 
intermediaries, shaping the social, and “making it bifurcate in unexpected 
ways” (Latour in Cowan & Carr, 2008, p. 152).  
Documents or texts frequently feature as key actants within actor-network 
analysis, and legal-documental networks are often studied in socio-legal 
applications of ANT (Law, 1986; Grabaham, 2011). Given that many of the 
points of contention in the Budlakoti case involve interpretation of documents 
and their circumstances of production (e.g., the passports issued in 
bureaucratic “error,” the affidavits judged to be tainted by faulty memory, 
etc.), ANT, with its focus on the “agency” of material objects such as 
documents, is an attractive tool to analyze the particularities of this case. 
ANT explores the hows and not the whys of the social (Law, 2009, p. 148). 
In order to examine the reasons why Canadian authorities questioned and 
denied citizenship status to Budlakoti, it is additionally important to examine 
the racialization of processes of citizenship revocation and statelessness, and 
the securitization of immigration and citizenship policies through a critical 
race and intersectional lens.9    
 
 
Statelessness in Canada 
 
As those who study statelessness both in Canada and internationally have 
observed, “data on statelessness is notoriously difficult to obtain and often 
unreliable” (Brouwer, 2012, p. 58). In the 2006 Canadian Census, 1,455 
persons self-identified as “stateless” when asked to select their country of 
origin (Brouwer, 2012, p. 58). Despite the relatively small numbers of 
stateless in Canada (or born of Canadian citizens), there are pressing reasons 
to make the production of statelessness in Canada a focus of research, 
analysis and public awareness. First, there is evidence of statelessness in 
Canada and new policy innovations that increase the likelihood of 
statelessness. Second, Canada has made an international commitment to 
reduce future statelessness by virtue of having signed and (in 1978) ratified 
																																																								
9 Given the limitations of space in this article, the analysis of the racialized and intersectional 
dimensions of the broader context of social relations of power are treated here in a fairly cursory 
manner. 
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the 1961 UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.10 Third, the fact 
that in 2014, the UNHCR embarked on a 10-year global campaign to end 
statelessness offers a unique contemporary moment to examine and address 
statelessness in Canada.  
What does it mean to be stateless in a country that has an international 
reputation for “statefullness,” characterized by a relatively democratic and 
socially inclusive citizenship regime? A stateful country accords some rights 
to stateless persons; but with far less legal obligation to the denationalized, 
these are not rights but discretionary privileges provided by a “generous” 
state. For those stripped of nationality, if additionally (as likely) deemed to be 
“inadmissible to Canada” for reasons such as serious criminality, treason, or 
terrorism, the stateless are prone to indefinite detention or banishment. 
Statelessness in Canada, as elsewhere, becomes a form of “political and civil 
death,” the total destruction of the individual’s status in organized society 
(Lavi, 2011, p. 800, citing Trop v Dulles). To be a stateless person is to face 
endless legal and practical erasure, suspicion, rejection and punishment on a 
daily basis. This includes the inability to prove one’s identity, register one’s 
marriage or birth of one’s children, move freely, and access health care, 
education, employment and other social services. Not having citizenship or 
permanent residence leaves stateless persons as ineligible to leave the country 
and robs them of the right to return, even to a country where they may have 
resided their entire lives. One who has had their citizenship extinguished and 
lacks the protection of any sovereign conforms to Giorgio Agamben’s 
concept of homo sacer: having been stripped bare of citizenship, the 
“accursed man” (or “sacred man,” a figure in Roman law) exists in a 
wasteland between exile and belonging, between life and death. Deprived of 
rights, homines sacri such as the stateless experience only “bare life” 
(Agamben, 1995).  
Agamben’s “states of exception,” such as promulgated by the global war 
on terrorism have produced homines sacri through laws to curtail, contain 
and monitor the state’s own citizens through illiberal and non-democratic 
means. Citizenship reforms in Canada, the United States, Australia and 
several European countries during the past decade have broadened grounds 
and paths for revocation and extinguishment of citizenship,11 opening up 
what Linda Kerber (2007, p. 24) calls new categories of “instability and 
potential statelessness.” Citizenship, long thought of as an “inalienable right,” 
particularly for those born with this status, is now increasingly recast as 
conditional upon conduct through the emergence of new “regimes of 																																																								
10 As of May 8, 2016, 65 state parties had ratified or acceded to the Convention (United Nations, 
2016). Importantly, Canada has yet to ratify the 1954 Convention, which would require Canada 
to actually put in place some kind of specific protections for stateless people. Principally, this 
could include a statelessness determination procedure separate from the refugee status 
determination process (Brouwer, 2012).  
11 As of 2014, 22 countries in Europe had passed laws permitting denaturalization for terrorism 
or other behavior contrary to the national interest (Forcese, 2014).  
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citizenship deprivation” meant particularly to target citizens who have 
engaged in or are suspected of supporting terrorist activity (Forcese, 2014; 
Lenard, 2016; Macklin, 2014). Through strengthening the “security state,” 
many liberal democracies are now sliding down the slippery slope in 
extinguishment policies, beginning with naturalized citizens, continuing with 
dual citizens, then moving to birthright citizens in revocation directed at so-
called “homegrown terrorists,” and finally countenancing such 
extinguishment even if the end product is statelessness.12 
As Barbara Jackman, a lawyer specializing in immigration law has pointed 
out, the move to citizenship deprivation was preceded in Canadian 
immigration law by several reforms that diminished the rights of permanent 
residents to remain in Canada for reasons of criminality and national security 
and strengthened executive powers to remove permanent residents (Jackman, 
2014). In the Canadian context, permanent residency has traditionally 
provided a broad range of citizenship-like rights, and often was seen as 
almost equivalent to Canadian citizenship. In the post-9/11 era, permanent 
residence had already become an increasingly precarious status.13  
The Conservative government, under Stephen Harper (2006-2015), 
introduced significant reforms that render Canadian citizenship conditional 
on meeting new criteria for conduct. The rationale for fortifying two-tiered 
citizenship was couched in terms of protecting national security through 
“refusing citizenship to individuals who pose a security risk,” and reinforcing 
the “value” of Canadian citizenship by making it harder to acquire and retain, 
and easier to revoke (Government of Canada, 2014b). In June 2015, the 
federal government’s Bill C-24, the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act 
came into effect, permitting the stripping of citizenship, not only among 
naturalized Canadians but also among those born in Canada holding a second 
nationality. Moreover, the law’s reach has been interpreted by some critics as 
applying not only to dual nationals, but to those simply having the imputed 
ability to acquire a second nationality “in another state through a parent or 
more distant relative” (National Immigration Law Section, Canadian Bar 
Association, 2014, pp. 17-18). As delineated below, this creates a “reverse 
																																																								
12 For a discussion of the trend in Europe and North America toward denationalization of citizens 
as a counter-terrorism strategy, manifesting the “securitization of citizenship” see the EUDO 
CITIZENSHIP Forum Debate (Macklin & Bauböck, 2015; see also Forcese, 2014; Macklin, 
2014). 
13 As non-citizens, permanent residents enjoy many but not all of the same rights as citizens; 
excluded are the right to vote and the right to travel abroad with a Canadian passport. Canadian 
citizens also enjoy privileged access to the Federal Public Service. The status of permanent 
residence is also more easily revocable than that of Canadian citizenship, leaving permanent 
residents more vulnerable to deportation. Thus, under sections 33 and 77 to 85 of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, permanent residents, but not citizens, may be 
inadmissible to Canada if suspected of violating human rights, having membership within 
organized crime, or perceived to be a threat to national security. Those issued “security 
certificates” are subject to removal orders. 
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onus,” whereby individuals have to prove that they are not citizens elsewhere 
in order to retain their citizenship in Canada. 
In the 2015 federal election campaign, the Harper government acted on the 
controversial new law, and moved to strip the Canadian citizenship of several 
men convicted of terrorist-related charges who were either incarcerated or 
had recently been released after serving their criminal sentences. The string 
of revocation notices provoked both human rights and security questions 
regarding the implications of banishing convicted terrorists, the revival of the 
medieval practice of “exile” as appropriate punishment in the “age of global 
terror,” and the use of “double punishment” (incarceration and deportation) 
by the government in its actions against its citizens convicted of terrorism 
(Macklin, 2014; Macklin & Bauböck, 2015; Forcese, 2014; Lenard, 2016).  
The augmented conditionality, distinctions among different “classes” of 
citizens, and revocability of citizenship were in keeping with the views, 
articulated by then Citizenship and Immigration Minister Chris Alexander, 
when sponsoring Bill C-24, Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act, that 
“Citizenship is not a right, it’s a privilege” and that it is not and never was 
inalienable (quoted in Black, 2014, n.p.). Since the October 2015 federal 
election, the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau, whose election promise 
was to restore equality among all Canadian citizens, has moved quickly to 
make good on its promise to repeal the parts of C-24 that applied to those 
convicted of terrorism-related crimes, ensuring that they can keep their 
Canadian passports.14 An important question that arises with the shift from 
the Conservative to the Liberal policies governing citizenship is what 
happens to those persons, such as Budlakoti, deprived of Canadian 
citizenship under the Conservatives and now caught in the transition between 
these two citizenship regimes?   
 
 																																																								
14At the time of writing (December 2016), Bill C-6, An Act to amend the Citizenship Act and to 
make consequential amendments to another Act had passed final reading in the House of 
Commons and was in the process of second reading in the Senate 
(www.parl.gc.ca/Content/Sen/Chamber/421/Debates/077db_2016-11-28-e.htm?Language=E#37) 
– Bill C-6 halts the government’s ability to strip citizenship from convicted terrorists and those 
who commit treason against Canada. Critics have charged, however, that Bill C-6 has failed to 
fix the lack of procedural fairness and safeguards for individuals facing citizenship revocation 
due to misrepresentation or fraud by ensuring that they have the right to an independent hearing 
and to consideration of compassionate and humanitarian factors (Kwan, 2016). It is also striking 
that the Trudeau government was reported as more aggressively pursuing citizenship revocation 
than the Harper Conservatives. According to Dyer (2016, n.p.), “the 184 revocation decisions of 
the first 10 months of the Trudeau government nearly match the total number of decisions over a 
27-year period between 1988 and the last month of the Harper government in October 2015.” As 
Jenny Kwan, NDP immigration, refugees and citizenship critic, argues: “It also does not matter 
that the misrepresentation is a result of an honest mistake even if you are a child and your parent 
presented misinformation on the application for whatever reason. Your citizenship could still be 
revoked and you cannot argue your case based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. This 
is wrong” (Kwan, 2016).  
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Deepan Budlakoti’s Journey to Statelessness 
 
How does a person who is born in Canada, has a Canadian birth certificate 
and passport, and who has spent his entire life in this country as a 
documented citizen face extinguishment of his citizenship and exile because 
of a “technicality”? Utilizing the logic of ANT, the production of Deepan 
Budlakoti’s statelessness can be traced through networks or “rhizomes” 
involving immigration administrative tribunals, citizenship law, discourses of 
fit citizenship, racial profiling and bordering processes, documents in more 
than one country, other realms of (e.g., criminal, anti-terrorism) law, the 
courts, and authorities connected with penal law.  
Budlakoti was born in Ottawa’s Grace Hospital on October 17, 1989. He 
has been resident in Canada throughout his life. His parents were Indian 
nationals who came to Canada in 1985 to work as private household help – 
gardening, cleaning and cooking for the Indian High Commissioner. As the 
judgment by Mr. Justice Phelan in Federal Court states, the parents’ 
“employment [with the Indian High Commission] terminated at some point in 
1989 – the exact date is hotly contested and the facts in this record are 
difficult to make out” (Budlakoti v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 
2014 FC 855, para. 17). According to one set of documents, submitted by 
Budlakoti’s lawyers (discussed below), his parents began working for a 
medical doctor in Nepean, Ontario beginning in June 1989.15 According to 
the documentary evidence favoured by the Immigration and Refugee Board 
(IRB) and courts, one or both parents continued to work for the Indian High 
Commissioner until December 1989, two months after Budlakoti’s birth.  
In 1992, Budlakoti’s parents applied for and were granted permanent 
residence (PR) for themselves and for Deepan, whom they listed as a 
dependant child in their application16 In 1995-97, his parents applied for and 
received Canadian citizenship for themselves; they did not submit a 
citizenship application for Deepan since by then they understood that through 
his birth in Ottawa, he already had (jus soli) Canadian citizenship. This 																																																								
15 “In the IRB proceedings, the mother claimed that while pregnant with the Applicant, she had 
stopped working for the High Commission. The father testified that he had left his job in June 
1989, applied for a Canadian work visa in Boston and moved into his new employer’s home. 
Additionally, their new employer (Dr. Dehejia) testified that he travelled to Boston with the 
Applicant’s father in the summer of 1989 to regularize the father’s status” (Budlakoti v. Canada 
(Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 855, para. 11). 
16 If Deepan had jus soli citizenship, his inclusion in his parents’ application for permanent 
residence was redundant. The courts have decided that the inclusion of Deepan in his parents’ PR 
application is evidence that they were employed by the Indian High Commission at the time of 
his birth, rather than based on an error on their part. The courts have also decided that the non-
inclusion of his name in his parents’ citizenship application is simply a neutral fact or at best an 
unfortunate circumstance, rather than evidence supporting his claim to jus soli citizenship. See 
Budlakoti, 2015, FCA, 139, para 5: “It is not clear why the appellant did not apply or why no 
application was made on his behalf. In any event, only the parents were granted Canadian 
citizenship.” 
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understanding was further reflected in Budlakoti’s inclusion in 1997 on his 
mother’s Canadian passport until he was 14 years old, and his own separate 
successful application for a Canadian passport thereafter. The government 
“clearly had no issue with his status” in issuing these Canadian passports to 
Budlakoti (Behrens, 2015, n.p.). For two decades after his 1989 birth and the 
issuance of a Canadian (Ontario) birth certificate, arguably a powerful actant 
that enrols other documents that are gateways to Canadian citizenship rights 
(e.g., passports, social assistance, health care coverage), Deepan’s networked 
existence as a Canadian citizen was unremarkable. The courts in Budlakoti 
dismiss such evidence of Deepan’s citizenship by simply arguing that the 
issuance of passports is “not determinative of citizenship” and merely reflects 
administrative errors on the part of passport-issuing authorities (Budlakoti v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 855, para. 39).  
Like many children of working class parents, Budlakoti had a difficult 
childhood; he ran away from home and became a ward of the Ontario state, 
where he witnessed and experienced violence in group homes. Like many 
other troubled Canadian youth in foster care, he fell into a life of crime as a 
young adult, was incarcerated and served his sentences. In December 2009, 
he was convicted of break and entry and was sentenced to four months. In 
late 2010, he was convicted of both weapons and narcotics trafficking and 
sentenced to three years in jail. While incarcerated, a prison official profiled 
Budlakoti as someone whose citizenship status should be investigated by 
Canadian immigration officials. This instigated private discussions of 
Budlakoti’s status among officials of Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
leading to a decision in 2011 that he was in fact not a Canadian citizen. It also 
led to a decision that as a permanent resident, Budlakoti was inadmissible to 
Canada on the grounds of “serious criminality” under the provisions of s. 
36(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (S.C 2001, c 27). One 
can only speculate what combination of his brown skin, dark beard and 
“foreign” name became significant actants in casting suspicion on Deepan 
Budlakoti’s “genuine” status as a Canadian citizen.  
Budlakoti’s case has often been treated unsympathetically by the mass 
media.17 Unlike victims who are portrayed as innocent or hapless, insofar as 
he has had significant brushes with the law, notice paid to his criminal 
convictions has often superseded focus on the fact that after two decades of 
his life as a documented and Canadian-born citizen with full protection of the 
state, he was deprived of his Canadian citizenship and rendered stateless. 
Viewed through the lens of “crimmigration,” however, the decidedly hostile 
and punitive action of the Conservative government to the issue of 
Budlakoti’s legal status reflects “double punishment,” the revival of practices 																																																								
17 According to Kane’s (2013) analysis of Canadian print media’s coverage on the stateless in 
Canada, the stateless are frequently depicted as enemies, dangerous and tricksters. The stateless 
are deemed blameworthy and the harsh effects of their legal and/or de facto statelessness 
diminished by the print media’s use of quotation marks or the qualifier “so-called” when 
discussing “stateless” persons. 
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of banishment and exile intersecting with erosion of rights of persons accused 
or convicted of crime (Hernández, 2013; Macklin, 2014).18 
In the IRB tribunal and courts, the extinguishment of Budlakoti’s Canadian 
citizenship has been rendered in terms of: 
 
“a significant factual dispute between the parties [and even by the Federal Court 
of Appeal as a “narrow question of fact,”] as to whether the Applicant’s parents 
left their Indian High Commission employment before or after his birth. If the 
parents left their employment before his birth, then the Applicant was entitled to 
Canadian citizenship by virtue of his birth.” (Budlakoti v. Canada (Citizenship 
and Immigration), 2014 FC 855, para.10)  
 
In the latter case, he would be considered as having acquired the right to 
citizenship under Section 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act. If not, he would be 
ineligible for jus soli citizenship by virtue of being “not applicable to children 
of foreign diplomats” under Section 3(2)(a) or 3(2)(b) of the Citizenship Act. 
Citizenship and Immigration Canada officials,19 the IRB, and the courts have 
thus far decided that Deepan is not a Canadian citizen and also that it is 
premature to conclude that he is stateless, because he has not applied for 
either Canadian or Indian citizenship.20  
In 2011, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration concluded that 
Deepan was a permanent resident, not a Canadian citizen. The government’s 
contention is not that they have revoked his Canadian citizenship, but that 
“despite his passport,” he has never been a Canadian citizen. As they 
determined that his parents were employees of the Indian High Commission 
at the time of his birth, Deepan was thus subject to the exception to jus soli 
citizenship applied to children born in Canada of diplomatic or consular 
officers or other representatives or employees in Canada of a foreign 
government. In October 2011, the IRB held an admissibility hearing, ruled 
Budlakoti inadmissible on the grounds of “serious criminality,”21 and issued a 
removal order to India, a country in which he had no social connection or 
familiarity. By the end of 2012, having served out his criminal sentence, he 																																																								
18 The effort to exile citizens convicted of criminal acts is in keeping with long-standing 
Conservative Party policy that regards deportation as an effective strategy to support the safety 
and security of legitimate Canadians. Thus, in Stand up for Canada, the 2006 Conservative Party 
of Canada Federal Election Platform, “effective deportation laws” are touted as a key strategy in 
keeping Canada’s borders safe from foreign criminals within and abroad (Conservative Party of 
Canada, 2006, p.27, cited in Kwak, 2016). 19	Soon	 after	 the	 new	 Liberal	 government	 of	 Canada	 took	 office	 in	 November	 2015,	 the	federal	department	Citizenship	and	Immigration	Canada	(CIC)	was	renamed	Immigration,	Refugees	and	Citizenship	Canada	(IRCC).	
20 Hon. Justice Phelan who heard the case in Federal Court, stated that “India has denied that the 
Applicant is a citizen of India or entitled to citizenship but the record on this issue is sketchy at 
best” (Budlakoti v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 855, para. 5.) 
21 Under s. 36(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, a permanent resident or a 
foreign national will be considered criminally inadmissible if he or she has been convicted (in 
Canada) of an offence: carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of at least 10 years; or for 
which a term of imprisonment of more than six months has been imposed. 
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was transferred into Customs and Border Protection Agency custody in 
Toronto’s Metro West Detention Centre pending removal in accordance with 
the removal order. In April 2013, he was released from custody on certain 
bonds and under strict conditions and surveillance. The government has been 
unsuccessful in its attempt to deport him to India as Indian authorities have 
found that he is not an Indian national and refused to issue him travel 
documents.22 Stripped of his Canadian citizenship, Budlakoti has been “left in 
a vulnerable position whereby his country of birth and residence has 
withdrawn his citizenship, thereby rendering him stateless” (Hameed, 2013, 
pp. 3-4).  
Today, as a stateless person, Budlakoti’s life is full of hardship, mental 
health issues, uncertainty, and crushing debt incurred from continuous 
litigation. He has worked for wages intermittently, waiting in some cases six 
months for work permits, and is ineligible for social assistance. His low 
educational level, criminal record, statelessness and threat of deportation 
have made it impossible for him to financially support himself. The 
government’s insistence that Budlakoti fill out documents to apply for a work 
permit confers foreignness upon him as only temporary foreign workers need 
fill out such forms. Similarly, in 2012 Budlakoti’s transfer from the prison 
where he was serving out his term to the West Detention Centre in Toronto, 
where he was detained under immigration law, established his foreignness, as 
such spaces are reserved for non-citizens. Just as citizenship is produced 
through documental networks, providing access to publicly funded health 
care, social services and basic democratic and legal rights, a reverse 
documental and material network has been enrolled to translate an erasure of 
Budlakoti’s legal and substantive citizenship.  
A particularly harsh effect of the extinguishment of his citizenship has been 
the cancellation of Budlakoti’s Ontario Health Insurance Program 
entitlements, and given his impoverishment, his inability to purchase private 
insurance. This withholding of public health care also reinforces his 
production as a non-citizen, whereby he joins “the ranks of an estimated half 
a million people in Canada [including the undocumented and new immigrants 
in the first three months of arrival] without access to medical care because of 
their immigration status” (Bozinoff, Goel, Jones, & Shahid, n.p., 2015). 
Despite a medical diagnosis that he has PTSD, he is unable to access therapy 
and health care more generally. In all realms of daily life where he has 
encountered the impossibility of retaining relationships, supporting himself, 
maintaining his health, etc., his experience reflects how an individual’s slide 																																																								
22 As the Applicant’s Record argues in Deepan Budlakoti and Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, “Significantly, the Indian government indicates that the Applicant is not an Indian 
citizen, a fact which is undisputed by [the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.] A relevant 
communication made by India to CBSA on March 18, 2013 regarding its position on the 
Applicant’s nationality [never communicated to Budlakoti]…was later discovered by the 
Applicant in September 2013 through a personal information request made by him under the 
Privacy Act” (Hameed, 2013).  
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to statelessness results in the most egregious of harms.23 In January 2016, 
Budlakoti was incarcerated on a new charge and subsequently released in 
August 2016 under strict monitoring and curfew conditions and subject to 
unannounced visits to his residence from Canadian Border Services Agency 
officials. At different points, Budlakoti’s citizenship extinguishment involved 
the seizure by authorities of those documents which had long been “proof” of 
his legal identity as a citizen (e.g., his passport and later his birth certificate).  
Thus far, Budlakoti has engaged in a fruitless round of litigation to regain 
his Canadian citizenship, having had his case decided first by Citizenship and 
Immigration (CIC) officials and the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), 
and then heard by the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal. The 
courts have refused to decide on “a factual matter” that had already been 
decided upon by the IRB. Thus, the IRB can be said to have enlisted the 
Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal to form an “eddy” of common 
opinion regarding the “factual matter” (the dates of Budlakoti’s parents’ 
cessation of employment with the Indian High Commission). The courts have 
also refused to provide a bare declaration of citizenship, arguing that 
Budlakoti had not exhausted all avenues or grounds for acquiring citizenship 
either in Canada or in India, the country of his parents’ birth. In January 
2016, the Supreme Court declined Budlakoti’s request for leave to appeal. 
His legal team has since worked to prepare an application under the 
Citizenship Act to the Citizenship Minister, assembling the documents that 
provide an alternative narrative to the “administrative error” and “diplomatic 
exception” stories created through the documental networks of the IRB and 
Canadian courts.  
 
 
The “Diplomatic Exception” to Birthright Citizenship 
 
I will now turn to one of the key junctures or interaction of elements in the 
networked production of Deepan’s statelessness – the rulings of immigration 
officials, an IRB tribunal, the Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal that 
Budlakoti was not a Canadian citizen under paragraph 3(1)(a) of the 
Canadian Citizenship Act. Thus far, all administrative and legal rulings have 
argued against the suggestion that the Canadian government revoked 
Budlakoti’s citizenship. Rather, they contend that Budlakoti had never been a 
Canadian citizen, as the offspring of parents employed by the Indian High 
Commission at the time of his birth; as such, his citizenship status was 
governed by section 3(2) of the Citizenship Act, which prohibited Canadian 																																																								
23 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), was a federal case in the United States in which the 
Supreme Court ruled, 5-4, that it was unconstitutional for the government to revoke the 
citizenship of a U.S. citizen as a punishment. Chief Justice Earl Warren described citizenship 
revocation as “a form of punishment more primitive than torture” as it inflicts the “total 
destruction of the individual's status in organized society” and “subjects the individual to a fate 
of ever-increasing fear and distress.”  
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citizenship at birth. As discussed above, what was presented through the 
network of litigation of his case were several documents and conflicting 
evidence about the dates of termination of employment of Budlakoti’s parents 
with the Indian High Commission.  
However, it is illuminating to first examine the assumptions underlying the 
section 3(2) exception in the Canadian Citizenship Act to birthright 
citizenship and its application to the case of Budlakoti. Foreign diplomatic 
missions and consular posts are governed by the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations, based upon principles of diplomatic immunity 
originating more than 3,000 years ago (Castro, 2014, p. 355). The Vienna 
Convention grants diplomats and their families numerous protections, 
including immunity from criminal and civil jurisdiction of receiving states 
(Castro, 2014, p. 353). The exception to birthright jus soli citizenship that 
excludes children born of parents who are representatives of foreign nations 
is widely assumed to be fair and equitable in those countries such as the 
United States and Canada that take this “expansive” approach to citizenship 
(Guendelsberger, 1992; Feere, 2011). 24  This is the “one area of solid 
agreement” among advocates on both side of the ongoing debate about 
automatic citizenship granted to children born of non-citizens (Feere, 2011, p. 
1).  
The exemption from jus soli citizenship for children born to foreign 
diplomatic staff is based on the perceived unfairness of automatic recognition 
of this citizenship where it would confer both the rights of diplomatic 
immunity from criminal and civil law in the country of birth and all the 
benefits of birthright citizenship. In a relatively wealthy country with a robust 
social rights and human rights record, the gain to the diplomat’s child of 
acquiring the rights, benefits and opportunities of the country of birth would 
be substantial. The fear is that lax regulation of jus soli citizenship for a child 
of foreign diplomats would create a “super citizen” who not only enjoys all 
the benefits of birthright citizenship but whose diplomatic immunity also puts 
him or her above the law (Feere, 2011, p. 1). 
Notwithstanding the consensus on the “diplomatic exception” to children 
gaining jus soli citizenship, in practice, an unknown number of children of 
foreign mission employees “mistakenly” receive jus soli citizenship. In the 
U.S. context, Feere (2011, p. 2) suggests that “the limiting language in the 
14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause has been effectively rendered a nullity 
as a result of a lack of regulations aimed at birth certificate and SSN [Social 
Security Number) issuance.” His contention is that “today’s application of the 
Citizenship Clause is so lax that the United States has a de facto universal 																																																								
24 The Citizenship Clause of the 14th Amendment in the U.S. Constitution provides: “All persons 
born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside.” The exception regarding children born to 
parents who are representatives of foreign nations is based on the fact that they are not “subject 
to the jurisdiction” of the United States and are therefore not to be granted U.S. citizenship 
(Feere, 2011, p. 1).  
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birthright citizenship policy that denies U.S. citizenship by birth to no one, 
including children born to foreign diplomats” (Feere, 2011, p. 2). The 
suggestion that the practice also occurs in Canada is reflected on the Global 
Affairs Canada website (n.d.) which provides redress instructions to diplomat 
parents of children “born in Canada who did not acquire Canadian 
citizenship,” and yet who had obtained a Canadian passport warning that 
“application for such a passport can be construed as misconduct,” and that 
any such passport should be surrendered.  
The “error” of granting birthright citizenship to children of diplomats is 
created through a chain of documents. As Global Affairs Canada (n.d.), notes, 
“children born of foreign representatives would normally obtain a provincial 
birth certificate.” The birth certificate in turn permits acquisition of a social 
insurance number and a Canadian passport. Notably, birth certificate request 
forms do not require declaration of parental diplomatic status. This practice is 
significant insofar as a Canadian long-form birth certificate in fact is a portal 
to citizenship – the key identity document to establishing one’s access to 
Canadian passports for children.  
It is not known how many Canadian-born children of foreign diplomats 
have followed the network of documents issued by Canadian federal and 
provincial government agencies from Canadian provincial birth certificate to 
acquisition of Canadian passport and access to a lifetime of treatment by all 
levels of the Canadian state as a Canadian citizen. In Canada, the issue of 
ethically questionable application of jus soli has focused primarily on so-
called “birth tourism” and “passport babies,” born to foreign women who 
come to Canada for the express reason of gaining Canadian citizenship for 
their Canadian-born children rather than children of foreign diplomats or 
employees (Wong, 2014). In the United States, the heated debate over 
intended scope of the 14th Amendment’s Citizenship Clause has focused 
primarily on U.S.-born children of “illegal immigrants.” Interestingly, in the 
U.S. context, Feere argues that the State Department has determined that birth 
to a foreign diplomat “may not necessarily bar an individual from being 
considered a U.S. citizen at birth.” The U.S. State Department’s 
determination “required a fact based analysis to determine whether he/she 
was born subject to the laws of the United States,” skirting the issue of 
whether such a child was “subject to the jurisdiction of” the U.S. (quoted in 
Feere, 2011, p. 5, emphasis added).  
How has the issue of birthright citizenship and the diplomatic exception 
been applied in the case of Deepan Budlakoti? As mentioned earlier, 
Deepan’s parents were never part of diplomatic staff; rather they were 
employed as low-level household workers for the Indian High Commissioner. 
Citizenship and Immigration officials, the IRB and the Federal Court and 
Federal Court of Appeal have all agreed that Budlakoti’s parents’ 
employment ended after their son’s birth, concluding that he had never been a 
Canadian citizen under S. 3(1)(a) of the Citizenship Act, his lack of such 
status governed by S. 3(2) of the Citizenship Act.  
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Budlakoti’s contention that he was born after his parents had concluded 
their employment with the Indian High Commission is supported by (among 
others) his Ontario certificate of live birth which lists a Nepean doctor’s 
address rather than the Indian High Commission as the residence of his 
parents, and affidavits signed by both the former Indian High Commissioner 
and the Nepean doctor. IRB officials and judges in subsequent court 
proceedings have treated with suspicion documents and forms of legal 
evidence that support Budlakoti’s contention that he was born after his 
parents left the Indian High Commission and therefore is entitled to jus soli 
Canadian citizenship. Instead they have favoured an alternative set of 
documents that indicate Budlakoti’s parents were still employed by the High 
Commission at the time of his birth. Thus, the affidavit evidence of the 
former Indian High Commissioner is reported to be “undermined” by the fact 
that the “3rd page of the four-page affidavit is missing” (Budlakoti, Judgment 
and Reasons, 2014 FC, para 22). The government and the courts relied on 
several documents from the Indian High Commission and an employment 
authorization from the Canadian government whose dates place the work 
departure of Budlakoti’s parents from the Indian High Commission in 
December 1989, about two months after Deepan’s birth. The integrity of 
these documents are never questioned by the IRB or Federal Court, even 
though the former Indian High Commissioner stated that the December date 
is in error.  
Central to ANT is the concept of “translation,” whereby all the actors in the 
network agree that the network is worth building and defending. Translation 
“requires a performative definition in which power is the consequence of an 
intense activity of enrolling, convincing and enlisting” (Cowan & Carr, 2008, 
p. 152). In Budlakoti’s case, this network where state power has been 
invested is one of extinguishment of his citizenship and production of 
statelessness. Documents that are enrolled to support this position and treated 
as factual are those that reinforce Deepan’s exemption from birthright 
citizenship (regardless of the possibilities that they may express 
administrative error, laxity or lag). Those that contradict this claim are here 
enrolled as lacking in integrity, undermined by several other documents, 
internally inconsistent, or (as in the case of Budlakoti’s passports) dismissed 
as having been produced in error and of no significance to his efforts to 
regain state and judicial recognition of his status as a Canadian citizen.  
If one pierces the thin technical argument regarding the determination of 
Budlakoti’s birthright citizenship, the rationale behind the Section 3(2)(b) 
exception to birthright citizenship simply does not apply in this case. The 
ambivalence expressed by the U.S. State Department to birthright citizenship 
of U.S.-born children of foreign diplomats, suggesting that it depends on 
whether they were “born subject to the laws of the [U.S.]” in fact suggests a 
deeper socio-legal understanding of citizenship. Deepan has never had access 
to a life of diplomatic privilege where he was not subject to the jurisdiction or 
the laws of Canada. Quite the contrary – in his troubled youth, he was a ward 
The Extraordinary Statelessness of Deepan Budlakoti	
 
Studies in Social Justice, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1-26, 2017 
19 
of the Ontario state. Justice Phelan (quoting Justice Shore in Al-Ghamdi, 
2007) states: “The objective of paragraphs 3(2) (a) and (c) of the Citizenship 
Act is to ensure that citizenship is not accorded to someone who is immune 
from almost every obligation of citizenship (e.g., paying taxes and respecting 
criminal law). This is manifestly an important objective” (Budlakoti v. 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 855, para. 48). Yet 
Budlakoti was never immune from the obligations of Canadian citizenship. 
He has been subjected to the full force of Canadian criminal law in his 
convictions and sentences. More sympathetic readings of his brushes with 
Canadian law have pointed out how his pleas and sentencing have reflected 
his status as a young and low-income person, and the particular 
vulnerabilities associated with his racialized Otherness (Behrens, 2015).  
The approach taken by the government and courts is a “reverse onus” 
approach, which places responsibility on individuals, faced with Canadian 
citizenship revocation, to show that they do not have citizenship in some 
other country, rather than on the state to prove that the decision to deprive 
individuals of citizenship will not render them stateless. Since the first 
determination by Canadian authorities that his citizenship had been issued in 
“administrative error” given his parents’ presumed employment with the 
Indian High Commission at the time of his birth, only those objects (mainly 
documents) in legal-administrative networks that reinforce his non-
citizenship in Canada have been enlisted to support the Canadian 
government’s case that Budlakoti is a non-citizen of Canada. The 
government’s actions were to his detriment in that Budlakoti had opportunity 
during this time to apply for Canadian citizenship. Yet he (and his parents) 
were implicitly discouraged from doing so by the reiterated assurances by the 
Canadian government, which issued Deepan passports (which involves 
vetting applicants to ensure that they are indeed Canadian), documents 
involved in his becoming a ward of the state, an OHIP card, etc., indicating 
he was indeed a Canadian citizen. A justice-based argument to restore 
Budlakoti’s citizenship would accept that his case is one of “detrimental 
reliance:” to his detriment, the Canadian state made him believe for about 20 
years through its various document-issuing actions that he was a Canadian.25  
The Canadian courts have thus far also refused to engage with a fuller 
socio-legal understanding of citizenship, following Nottebohm, based upon a 
“genuine link” to a state, and “a social fact of attachment.” The genuine link 
principle of citizenship may be limiting in an era of globalization whereby 
more people are living and working internationally, and individual’s social 
and affective ties to nation-states have attenuated. However, in cases such as 
Budlakoti’s involving extinguishment of citizenship, Nottebohm’s dicta 
remain appropriate and effective, “serving to protect precisely the kind of 
deep social bonds emphasized in Nottebohm against a formal nationality 																																																								
25 I would like to thank Audrey Macklin (personal communication) for bringing this argument to 
my attention. 
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imposed by law” (Sloane, 2009, p. 5, emphasis added). A test of “effective 
nationality” seems appropriate in the Budlakoti case, whereby genuine links 
in Canada, created in part by the state’s repeated treatment and verification of 
Budlakoti as a citizen for over 20 years, provide strong arguments for the “re-
recognition” of his citizenship.  
The courts have also declared Budlakoti’s statelessness to be “premature” 
in that he has not pursued other grounds than birthright citizenship, such as 
“Special and unusual hardship” of Subsection 5(4) of the Canadian 
Citizenship Act. They also have suggested that Budlakoti should explore 
application for Indian national status or citizenship: they import essentialist 
reasoning to assert that since he was “born of two Indian nationals” this gives 
him “considerable connection with India” (Budlakoti v Canada (Citizenship 
& Immigration), 2015 FCA 139, para. 32, 49). 
The courts define Mr. Budlakoti’s legal status as not necessarily and 
prematurely stateless, arguing that his circumstances are not beyond his 
control. It can be very difficult to provide satisfactory evidence of 
statelessness as it requires proving a negative, the absence of a nationality. It 
is also unjust that some one who has had his life-long citizenship 
extinguished in the country where he was born and lived his entire life has 
additionally to undergo overwhelming financial debts and prolonged process 
to prove that he has no nationality (in this case in India). In the interim stretch 
of many years, his everyday life is plagued by the indignities and “protection 
gap” of de facto statelessness.  
   
 
Conclusion 
 
As the most abject “Other” to the citizen, the stateless serve an important 
boundary function for the state in securing its sovereignty and stabilizing its 
borders (Kerber, 2009, p. 31). The “stateless serve the state,” writes Linda 
Kerber, “by signaling who will not be entitled to its protection, and throwing 
fear into the rest of us” (Kerber, 2009, p. 31). The decision by the 
Conservative government to strip Mr. Budlakoti’s citizenship was clearly 
shaped by the motivations underlying its citizenship revocation reforms that 
“tethers citizenship revocation to criminal convictions” (Macklin, 2014, p. 
29). By making citizenship alienable on the basis of a sliding scale of 
“criminality,” citizenship is no longer a right but a “revocable privilege” and 
is downgraded to an “enhanced form of conditional permanent residence” 
(Macklin, 2014, p. 29). Under the Conservative government, which stripped 
Budlakoti of both his citizenship and basic human rights, an application to the 
Citizenship Minister under the prior government was perceived by Budlakoti 
to be tainted by pre-judgments regarding his criminality as grounds for 
citizenship stripping and exile (Keung, 2013)  
Utilizing the insights of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), the production of 
Budlakoti’s statelessness has been traced through heterogeneous networks 
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involving prison officials, racial profiling and bordering processes, 
immigration administrative tribunals, the Citizenship Act, discourses of fit 
citizenship, documents in more than one country, other realms of (e.g., 
criminal, anti-terrorism) law, the courts, lawyers and judges.  
Immigration lawyers such as Barbara Jackman are critical of the manner in 
which under the Conservative government, the Canadian courts have built 
case law in terms of a stack of negative cases, which permit the cavalier 
extinguishment of an appellant’s citizenship and human rights. Referring to a 
context of “gutting of Charter Rights since the Supreme Court imposed a 
standard of ‘reasonableness’,” Jackman (2014) argues the “the ability of 
people to challenge cases…has gone experientially down since the Supreme 
Court imposed that standard [of reasonableness].” She specifically refers to 
Justice Phelan’s Federal Court ruling extinguishing Budlakoti’s citizenship, 
as the “most demeaning decision in terms of Deepan’s rights as a human 
being” (see Budlakoti vs. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) 2014, FC 
855). How is it the case that once the “error” (of daily treating and 
confirming a person’s citizenship all his life) is unearthed, the courts can 
decide that their course of action need not be, in Justice Phelan’s words, “the 
least impairing imaginable,” but only necessary to ensure that “the law falls 
within a range of reasonable alternatives” (Budlakoti, FC 2014 855, para 77)? 
As I have argued in this paper, certain “simple facts of law” such as the 
diplomatic exception to birthright citizenship in the Canadian Citizenship Act 
are worthy of scrutiny as they hold tremendous power over persons’ lives. 
The regulation of this diplomatic exception is clearly not cut and dry: as a 
document-requiring nation, Canada has relied on birth certificates for 
issuance of citizenship cards, thus permitting an untold number who might 
technically fit the diplomatic exception to slip by without notice, to have their 
lives legitimated through a legal documental network produced by multiple 
agencies that reinforces their Canadianness. For those, like Budlakoti, who 
are documented citizens all their lives, the courts need to import richer, more 
rights-based and genuine link notions of citizenship rather than snuff out their 
citizenship on the basis of a technicality. This is the argument made by 
Budlakoti (e.g., in 2013 at the Federal Court) where he “emphasized the 
importance of citizenship to personhood and one’s sense of belonging and 
well-being” (Budlakoti v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 
855, para. 18). This historically prior legal documental network, that 
establishes that Budlakoti was since birth a Canadian, needs to be identified 
and enrolled to contest the administrative error and diplomatic exception 
stories narrated in tribunal and court decisions that argue Budlakoti was never 
a Canadian citizen. This is precisely what Budlakoti himself and the Justice 
for Deepan committee (online and through various events) are attempting to 
do in an ongoing campaign to educate various publics and elected officials 
about the injustice of Budlakoti’s citizenship extinguishment, while 
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supporting a legal and now administrative process to win back his 
citizenship.26  
Despite severe limitations on his geographic mobility imposed by CBSA, 
Budlakoti has himself been an activist – raising funds and awareness of his 
situation through a speaking tour in several Canadian cities. He has also 
supported other causes within his experience, such as the inhumane 
conditions of prisoners in criminal detention. Budlakoti has clearly 
galvanized and created several new networks as justice-minded lawyers and 
university students have been working on different files governing his status. 
Impressively, it was the awareness of his experience through one of his 
speaking engagements in Toronto that led to the founding in 2014 of the new 
advocacy-focused Canadian Centre on Statelessness (n.d.). 27 Despite the 
enrollment of the governmental networks in effecting a legal erasure and 
reduction to “bare life,” Budlakoti has clearly refused banishment from 
Canadian society and the status of homo sacer (Agamben, 1995).  
Currently, under a new Liberal government that has made it clear that “a 
Canadian is a Canadian is a Canadian,”28 there is some hope though no 
guarantee of reinstatement of Budlakoti’s birthright citizenship. An important 
question posed by his case is what happens when individuals fall between the 
cracks in the transition between two citizenship regimes. The Trudeau 
government’s Bill C-6, which amends the Citizenship Act, contains a 
provision that would restore the citizenship of any convicted terrorists who 
lost it as a result of changes brought in by the previous Conservative 
government (Bell, 2016). In addition, the current Citizenship Minister has 
promised not to take any further action against nine terrorists who had 
received notices informing them their citizenship was being revoked (Bell, 
2016). This suggests an openness in the current government to a solution 
supporting restitution of Budlakoti’s human right to his birthright citizenship 
rather than permitting the punitive ethos of the prior Conservative 
government to govern the final disposition of his legal identity. More 
broadly, this extraordinary case of statelessness exposes how the 
strengthening of Canadian citizenship requires that it become more difficult 
rather than easier to lose.   
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
26 See www.justicefordeepan.org/, Budlakoti’s latest effort to build support for his case involves 
showing a 15-minute documentary, “Stateless” directed by Amar Wala, about his case to 
audiences in various Canadian cities. As of writing, Budlakoti’s lawyers are preparing a 
Citizenship Application to the Minister (of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship). 
27 See also www.statelessness.ca/about-us.html. 
28 This was a slogan repeatedly used by current Prime Minister Justin Trudeau during the 2015 
federal election campaign.  
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